We describe a logic which is the same as first-order logic except that it allows control over the information that passes down from formulas to subformulas. For example the logic is adequate to express branching quantifiers. We describe a compositional semantics for this logic; in particular this gives a compositional meaning to formulas of the 'information-friendly' language of Hintikka and Sandu. For first-order formulas the semantics reduces to Tarski's semantics for first-order logic. We prove that two formulas have the same interpretation in all structures if and only if replacing an occurrence of one by an occurrence of the other in a sentence never alters the truth-value of the sentence in any structure. 1
For over a third of a century we have had adaptations of first-order logic which allow control of the amount of information passing from formulas to their subformulas. In 1979 Jon Barwise [2] set it as a challenge to find a compositional semantics for logics of this kind. Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu [12] recently revived the challenge. The logic described in this paper contains both first-order logic and the main extensions studied by Barwise, Hintikka and Sandu. I give a compositional semantics for it. For first-order formulas this semantics reduces to the usual Tarski semantics. For sentences of the logic studied by Hintikka and Sandu, it agrees with their noncompositional semantics. It also satisfies the appropriate form of 'full abstraction', to borrow a term from the computer scientists; this means briefly that the interpretation of each formula exactly describes the contribution which the formula makes to the truth of sentences containing it. This paper falls into two parts. The first part introduces the relevant ideas one by one, with some historical commentary. The second part consists mainly of definitions; it presents the same logic and the same compositional semantics, but more formally and without reference to the games which Barwise, Hintikka and Sandu used to define their non-compositional semantics.
PART I

Compositionality
The principle of compositionality states that the meaning of a compound sentence is determined by the meanings of its constituents and the way they are put together to form the sentence. (Cf. Janssen [13] .) Gottlob Frege seems to be the source of this principle. Late in his career he suggested [6] that it is an empirical fact about natural languages, verified by the fact that we frequently create and understand new sentences.
The main problem for this view is that 'constituent' is pretty clearly a term of art, even granting that we have strong intuitions about how to divide sentences up into constituents. If a natural unit of meaning in a sentence seems to depend on scattered pieces of the sentence, there is a strong temptation to say that these pieces form a 'deep level constituent' -for example, that only half the job is a deep level constituent of He only did half the job.
So one adjusts the notion of constituent in order to rescue compositionality.
With the formal languages of logic this problem doesn't arise. These languages spring from Zeus' head ready armed with a grammatical analysis, and the analysis allows very little freedom for the notion of a constituent. On the simplest reading, constituents are the same thing as subformulas. (One can regard terms as smaller constituents, but in this paper we shall never need to.)
First-order logic is a typical example. Atomic formulas are atomic constituents. We build up new formulas by applying operators to one or more old formulas. Thus ¬φ comes from φ by applying ¬, and (φ ∧ ψ) comes from φ and ψ by applying ∧. Compositionality says that the meaning of, say, (φ ∧ ψ) is definable in terms of the meanings of φ and ψ by a definition that depends only on ∧.
Formal languages have built-in grammars, but they need not have built-in notions of meaning. We shall see in a moment that there are at least two standard semantics for first-order logic, one compositional and one not. Both of these semantics satisfy the truth-value principle:
The meaning of a sentence φ of signature Σ determines, for each structure A of signature Σ, whether or not φ is true in A.
(This principle is most definitely not from Frege.) There is a cheap way to get a compositional semantics: define the semantics of a formula φ to be the formula φ itself. This semantics satisfies the truth-value principle, in an uninformative way. Fortunately we have a way to rule it out of court. One should look back to Frege, and to another principle which Frege's followers have distilled from his writings:
The meaning of a phrase is the contribution which the phrase makes to the truth or otherwise of sentences which contain it as a constituent.
Or paraphrasing a little, Two formulas φ(x) and ψ(x), say of signature Σ, have the same meaning if and only if for every signature Σ ′ containing Σ, every sentence χ of signature Σ ′ , and every structure A of signature Σ ′ , the truth or otherwise of χ in A is not affected if we replace an occurrence of φ in χ by an occurrence of ψ.
Computer scientists will recognise this as the relevant form of the full abstraction property. Any sensible compositional semantics must be fully abstract.
Barwise [2] suggests that a compositional semantics should satisfy a further condition: the relation 'φ is true in A' should be an inductive verifiability relation in the sense of Barwise and Moschovakis [3] . The languages that we shall be considering don't have a semantics meeting his condition-he proves this in his paper. There was no reason to expect otherwise. But in any case I see no argument in favour of his condition.
Semantic games
The simplest way to describe a non-compositional semantics for first-order logic is by way of games. There are two players, ∀(belard) and ∃(loise), respectively male and female. On the table sits a structure A of signature Σ. For convenience we shall sometimes assume that the signature contains a name for each element of A; otherwise the players might need to invent names as they go. Also on the table is a first-order sentence φ of signature Σ.
A game G(φ, A) is defined by induction on the structure of the sentence φ. If φ is an atomic sentence, then either it is true in A and player ∃ wins outright, or it is false in A and player ∀ wins outright. If φ is compound, the structure of φ determines which player must make the next move, and what happens next.
For example in the case of first-order logic the following definitions apply.
φ is (ψ ∨ χ): Player ∃ chooses a sentence θ ∈ {ψ, χ}, and the game proceeds as G(θ, A). φ is (ψ ∧ χ): The same except that player ∀ makes the choice. φ is ¬ψ: The game proceeds as G o (ψ, A), which is the same game as G(ψ, A) except that the players ∀ and ∃ are transposed throughout. φ is ∃vψ(v): Player ∃ chooses a name c of an element of A, and the game proceeds as G(ψ(c), A). φ is ∀vψ(v): The same except that player ∀ makes the choice.
We owe this definition to Hintikka; cf. [10] p. 100f. Now we say that the sentence φ is true in A, in symbols A |= φ, if and only if player ∃ has a winning strategy for the game G(φ).
Hintikka [10] speaks of these definitions giving 'a full-fledged semantical theory of first-order logic'. This semantic theory is not compositional. It assigns meanings only to sentences, not to formulas with free variables. True, there are natural ways of extending it to give meanings to all formulas. But the important point is that these extensions are an optional extra; the definition of the meaning of a sentence doesn't go by way of the meanings of its subformulas.
In this game semantics, the condition defining 'φ is true in A' begins with a higherorder existential quantifier:
There is a strategy for ∃ such that . . . One can't say what the strategy is supposed to do until the whole sentence has been assembled. This puts game semantics very broadly into the same league as the Discourse Representation Theory of Hans Kamp [14] or the related File Change Semantics of Irene Heim. On their view (cf. page 114 of [14] ), the semantic interpretation (in a model M ) of an utterance or sequence of utterances in a natural language has the form There is a function which embeds K into M where K is a suitable discourse representation structure for the utterances. As it stands, discourse representation theory is not compositional, but Jeroen Gronendieck and Martin Stokhof later showed how to convert it to a compositional theory [7] .
For first-order logic we already had Tarski's definition of truth. It is a theorem (equivalent to the axiom of choice) that the game-theoretic definition of truth agrees with Tarski's. But Tarski's theory is compositional (at least as a theory of satisfaction). Since the word 'meaning' doesn't often appear in statements of Tarski's definition, this needs a little explanation.
Let φ(x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) be a first-order formula of signature Σ whose free variables all occur in the list x 0 , . . . , x n−1 , and let A be a structure of signature Σ. Then Tarski's definition finds a set φ A of ordered n-tuplesā of elements of A, namely those which satisfy the formula φ in A; in symbols
Let us (temporarily) call φ A the interpretation of φ in A. If φ is a sentence, then on Tarski's account, φ is true in A if and only if φ A is { } (where is the empty tuple), and φ is false in A if and only if φ A is empty. We define the Tarski meaning of φ to be the function which takes each structure A to the set φ A . Tarski's definition is compositional for each structure separately; for example (φ ∧ ψ)
A is defined in terms of φ A and ψ A . It is also fully abstract. One direction is trivial: if two formulas have the same Tarski meaning, then they certainly make the same contribution to the truth-value of sentences containing them, because by definition the only contribution these formulas make to this truth-value is their meaning. The other direction needs a small argument: if φ(x) and ψ(x) have different meanings, then there is a structure A such that
is true in A. So much for the background. Now we turn to our main topic, languages with imperfect information.
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Imperfect information
A game is said to be of perfect information if each player is allowed to know, whenever he or she moves, what were all the previous choices made in the play. This makes no difference whatever to either the rules for playing the game, or the criterion deciding who wins. But it does affect the possible strategies of the players. A player can't use a strategy which makes that player's choices dependent on earlier choices which are hidden from him or her.
So we have the notion of a game of imperfect information, where there is an information rule that states, at each step of the game, what the player who moves next is allowed to know about the previous history of the play. A strategy for a player in this game is a set of rules which tell this player how to choose at each of his or her moves, depending only on facts which he or she is allowed to know at the time.
Example 3.1 Let φ be the sentence ∀x∃y x = y. Let the game G(φ, A) be as defined in the previous section, but now add the information rule that player ∃, when she chooses, is not allowed to know what element ∀ chose. It's not hard to see that if the structure A has two or more elements, then player ∃ doesn't have a winning strategy for this game. (As it happens, neither does ∀.) So in this semantics, φ is not true in a structure with more than one element.
In 1961 Leon Henkin [9] proposed a new kind of quantifier. Let ψ(x, y; v, w) be a first-order formula, say of signature Σ, and A a structure of signature Σ. Let φ be the expression written (∀x) (∃v) (∀y) (∃w) ψ.
We define a game G: first player ∀ chooses elements a, b, and then player ∃ chooses elements c, d. Player ∃ wins if and only if
A |= ψ(a, b; c, d).
We say that a strategy σ for player ∃ is allowed if σ finds c as a function of a and d as a function of b. Then φ is defined to be true if and only if player ∃ has an allowed winning strategy for the game G. Or, quantifying over functions, φ is true in A if and only if A |= (∃g)(∃h)(∀x)(∀y) ψ(x, y; g(x), h(y)).
Henkin's definition is easy to rephrase in terms of games of imperfect information. The information rule says that when she chooses c, player ∃ is only allowed to remember what a was; when she chooses d she is only allowed to remember what b was. In Henkin's notation, our example 3.1 above was equivalent to the sentence . Their formulas are written linearly, like ordinary first-order formulas. But a quantifier (∃y/∀x, ∀t) marks a point where player ∃ must choose an element for y without knowing what elements player ∀ has already chosen for x and t. The expression (∨/∀x) is a disjunction; the semantics is that player ∃ must pick one of the disjuncts without knowing which element player ∀ chose for x. With this notation, the x in (∨/∀x) becomes a new kind of free variable which needs to be bound by an earlier occurrence of ∀x (not ∃x).
(There is now a fuller account in Hintikka [11] , which appeared after I had written this paper.)
As a catch-all, let us refer to languages with features of these kinds as languages of imperfect information. There are further examples in Enderton [5] , Harel [8] and Walkoe [23] . Briefly, these are languages where a quantifier within the syntactic scope of another quantifier need not be within its semantic scope. (Contrast discourse representation theory [14] and dynamic predicate logic [7] , where a quantifier may bind a variable lying outside its syntactic scope, and the sequence semantics of Kees Vermeulen [21] which allows one to give meanings to parts of a sentence that are not syntactic constituents. These are different situations from ours, though one can sense some analogies.)
Nothing is entirely new. In the first half of the sixteenth century several logicians in Paris (mostly Spaniards and Britons) amused themselves by asking what it would do for the semantics of the sentence Every man is an animal.
if the animal had to be specified independently of the man. Ashworth ([1] p. 610f) comments that these logicians display considerably more flexibility and subtlety than scholastic logicians have usually been credited with . . .
The challenge
Hintikka and Sandu [12] claim that their language gives the right formalism for some curious phenomena in natural language semantics. Barwise [2] makes a similar claim, though his preferred examples use quantifiers which are not adaptations of first-order quantifiers. On these claims I bite my tongue; I am not a linguist. I only remark that at least mathematical English has some very well established devices that correspond to the Hintikka-Sandu slashes. Take this from Serge Lang [15] (p. 146, one of several examples of the same device in this book): PROPOSITION 2. Let 0 < a ≤ 1, and m an integer with |m| ≥ 2. Let s = σ + iT m with −a ≤ σ ≤ 1 + a and T m as above. Then
where B is a number depending on a but not on m and σ.
Without the last nine words, Lang's proposition expects to be formalised as ∀a ∀m ∀σ ∃B φ(a, m, σ, B).
But the effect of the final phrase is to push the existential quantifier two places to the left: ∀a ∃B ∀m ∀σ φ(a, m, σ, B).
I am not sure how much sense this device makes in ordinary English, but mathematics students seem to pick it up easily and accurately.
Be that as it may, it's clear that the devices introduced by Henkin et al. do have a well-defined semantics in terms of games. But as we saw earlier, game semantics is not naturally compositional. Can we find a compositional semantics that stands to the game semantics of imperfect information as Tarski's semantics stands to Hintikka's game semantics for ordinary first-order logic?
Hintikka and Sandu [12] thought not:
But the very idea of quantifier independence [in our logic] violates the principle of compositionality.
Likewise Hintikka on page 110ff of [11] :
No perverse ingenuity can make the semantics of sentences like [example given] conform to compositionality. . . . there is no realistic hope of formulating compositional truth-conditions for [sentences with slashes], even though I have not given a strict impossibility proof to that effect.
In the same vein Barwise [2] remarked that Linguistically, the discovery of branching quantification would force us to reexamine, and perhaps re-interpret, Frege's principle of compositionality according to which the meaning of a given expression is determined by the meanings of its constituent phrases. For example, the meaning of a branching quantifier expression of logic [here follows an example] cannot be defined inductively in terms of simpler formulas, by explaining away one quantifier at a time.
To justify this comment, Barwise invoked the inductive verifiability criterion which I mentioned earlier.
There are in fact two problems about making the game semantics compositional. The first is the one we have already noted: the condition for a strategy to be winning depends on the sentence as a whole. The second problem (noted by Hintikka and Sandu [12] ) is that the game semantics for a sentence φ doesn't naturally extend to a game semantics for sentences containing φ. Take for example ¬φ: there seems to be no natural game G ′ for which ∃ has a winning strategy if and only if ∃ doesn't have a winning strategy for G(φ, A). This is because the game G(φ, A) is in general undetermined. Thus player ∃ having no winning strategy is not the same thing as player ∀ having a winning strategy, and this prevents us using the game semantics which Hintikka gave for ¬ in classical logic. The result is that we have no game-theoretic intuitions about the meaning of ¬ when it's applied to formulas with slashes. If these formulas have free variables, then I'm not sure that we have any other kinds of intuition about the meaning of ¬ either. The papers mentioned above all avoid the problem by restricting where ¬ can occur.
What I have done below is to separate Hintikka's game-theoretic negation (which I write henceforth as ∼, following Hintikka [11] ) from 'classical' negation ¬. We know how ¬ should behave when it's applied to sentences. It turns out that there is a mathematically natural definition for the semantics of ¬ which gives the right answer on sentences and on formulas without slashes, and which seems to cause no trouble for the metatheorems of the language.
Quine ([17] pp. 108ff) discusses whether one should admit branching quantifiers to 'our quantification theory'. The only comment I make on Quine's question is that I don't understand it. (Perhaps its cash value is 'Should branching quantifiers be taught to philosophy undergraduates at Harvard?') Quine's answer is No, and his reason does deserve a comment. It is that branching quantifiers should be thought of as talking covertly of functions . . . , and as receiving a just analysis in [terms of Skolem functions]. This is fair enough if we take the game semantics as primary. But the compositional semantics to be described below doesn't involve functions, any more than Tarski's semantics for ordinary first-order logic involves functions. (On the other hand it does involve sets of tuples where Tarski's semantics had just single tuples. Maybe Quine would regard this as grounds for exclusion from 'our quantification theory'.)
Deathtraps
I think I was not alone in finding the claim of Barwise, Hintikka and Sandu very hard to get into focus. In retrospect there were two main reasons for this. The first was that certain things which are obviously equivalent for first-order logic split apart when there is imperfect information. The second was that the idea of 'what a player is allowed to know', though it has a strong intuitive content, can be very misleading. Readers with more robust intuitions than mine can skip this section; it motivates later definitions, but they can be read without it.
Example 5.1 Let φ be the sentence
and let ψ be the equivalent sentence i∈{1,2}
The two games G(φ, A) and G(ψ, A) are identical:
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First player ∀ chooses a number i ∈ {1, 2}; then player ∃ chooses an element a of A. Player ∃ wins if A |= P i (a).
Suppose we stipulate now that player ∃ must choose a without knowing whether player ∀ chose 0 or 1. This makes φ into φ ′ , namely
and ψ into the sentence ψ ′ :
Do these two sentences φ ′ and ψ ′ mean the same thing? The answer becomes clear if we rewrite the question in terms of Skolem functions. In these terms, φ is equivalent to φ Sk , namely
while ψ is equivalent to ψ Sk , namely
(The higher-order quantifier ∃s expresses that a strategy exists.) Hiding the information about player ∀'s first move means making the Skolem functions independent of that move, and so we get ψ 
These are far from equivalent to each other.
The best way to sort out this mild paradox is to think throughout in terms of strategies. A strategy for player ∃ consists of a set of functions attached to the 'choice points', i.e. the points in the game where she has a choice; they name a possible choice as a function of earlier choices. The crucial difference between φ and ψ is that player ∃ has two choice points in φ, but only one in ψ.
If you insist on thinking in terms of players making choices in the light of information received, then you should say the following. Even in conditions of imperfect information, a player is allowed to know which stage the game has reached. This knowledge may compensate for incomplete information about earlier choices. After player ∀ has chosen left or right in φ, player ∃ must know which subformula she is working on, and under the circumstances this indirectly tells her what choice player ∀ has made. Hintikka and Sandu [12] were wise to drop the device of hiding information about choices at conjunctions or disjunctions, as in (∃/∧ 1 ) (which appeared in Sandu [18] ), since our discussion shows that this kind of concealment is in general a fake. (A referee pleads that it can still work in some circumstances; I grant that, but an argument is needed.)
Note that ψ in example 5.1 has the subformula
which has a free index i. Usually one thinks of ψ as a notational variant of φ, so that there is no need to introduce indices as an explicit part of the syntax. For the reasons just discussed, this option is not open to us when there are slashes. This is why the language in Part II below has indices as well as variables.
Example 5.2
Consider the sentence ∀x∃y∃zR(x, y, z).
It's a well-known fact, going back to Skolem [20] , that a strategy for player ∃ can be assumed to depend only on previous choices of player ∀. In this example, player ∃ has a winning strategy for the game on a structure A if and only if
Defining s
, this reduces to
Suppose now that we impose an information rule: player ∃ must make her second choice without knowing player ∀'s choice. This means, one might think, that s ′ 2 must be independent of x, and so the condition for ∃ to have a winning strategy becomes
Wrong! Suppose for example that R(x, y, z) is the formula x = z. Then the condition just stated is that A |= ∃z∀x x = z, which says that A has exactly one element. But going back to strategies where ∃ is allowed to know her own earlier moves, the following strategy
always wins the game for ∃, in any structure A. The effect of the information rule is to make s 2 (x, y) independent of x, but not of y.
The trick here is that in conditions of imperfect information, it makes a difference whether a player can glean information from his or her own previous moves. I thank my MSc class on logical games for making me aware of this. But already von Neumann and Morgenstern, founding fathers of game theory, pointed out in [22] p. 52ff that it's an aspect of the phenomenon known as 'signalling' in Whist and Bridge:
signal Whist family Any convention of play whereby one partner properly informs the other of his holdings or desires. (Morehead et al. [16] )
In these games there are two players, and each player consists of two partners. A state of play consists of the cards on the table and in the hands of the players. In general a pair of partners know different things about the state of play, but one of them can use his public moves to signal information to the other partner. Bridge is an example of a game of imperfect information which lends itself very badly to the notion of 'the information available to a player'.
In the light of example 5.2, one might ask why Hintikka and Sandu in [12] only shield a player from earlier choices of the other player. (I thought at first that it might have been an oversight, but page 63f of Hintikka [11] suggests not.)
Pressing
(∃x/i) P i (x), and the imperfect information version of the sentence of example 5.2 comes out as
In this way a variable x i in a slashed quantifier (∃x n /x i ) behaves just like a free variable, in the sense that it needs to be bound by an earlier quantifier ∃x i or ∀x i .
In what follows I shall use this better syntax. Obviously this won't diminish the expressive power of the language. Example 5.2 illustrates another important point. In a compositional semantics, the interpretation of a formula φ(x, y), where y doesn't occur free in φ, should be definable in terms of the interpretation of φ(x). For first-order logic this is so trivially true that one never notices it. For logics of imperfect information it is not trivial.
Game semantics under perfect information
Throughout this section, we work with an ordinary first-order language. In preparation for languages of imperfect information, we can assume that our language includes not only the ordinary conjunction ∧ and disjunction ∨, but also indexed conjunctions i∈I and disjunctions i∈I . These will behave like quantifiers except that they range over fixed index sets I rather than the domain of a structure.
We need to assign game-theoretic meanings to formulas with free variables or indices. If φ has free variables or indices then G(φ, A) will be a 'game with free variables'. To make sense of this notion, recall that in many games the initial position is a gift of Nature, for example a random deal of cards to the players. We shall call this initial position a deal. A contest is a family of games which are distinguished by their opening deals.
In these terms we can refine our definition of the game G(φ, A). For every structure of a fixed signature Σ, and every formula φ of signature Σ, we shall define a contest G(φ, A) where the possible deals are sequences of length n, and n is the number of free variables and free indices of φ. (A deal will in general be a sequence of elements of A and elements of index sets.) We write G(φ, A,ā) for the game in this contest with dealā.
For ordinary first-order logic without indexed conjunctions and disjunctions the definition of the contest runs as follows. φ is atomic: For each dealā, player ∃ wins G(φ, A,ā) outright if A |= φ(ā); otherwise player ∀ wins outright. φ is (ψ ∨ χ): Given a dealā, player ∃ chooses a formula θ ∈ {ψ, χ}, and the game proceeds as G(θ, A,ā). φ is (ψ ∧ χ): The same except that player ∀ makes the choice. φ is ¬ψ: For a dealā, the game proceeds as G o (ψ, A,ā), which is the same game as G(ψ, A,ā) except that the players ∀ and ∃ are transposed throughout. φ is ∃x n ψ(x n ): Given a dealā, player ∃ chooses a name c of an element of A, and the game proceeds as G(ψ, A,āc). φ is ∀x n ψ(x n ): The same except that player ∀ makes the choice.
One can also give an inductive definition of the set of possible deals for the contest G(φ, A), but I leave this to the reader. We can read the clauses for quantifiers as covering the cases of indexed conjunctions and disjunctions too.
Until further notice I assume that the symbol ∼ never occurs except immediately in front of atomic formulas, where it is harmless.
If φ is a formula ∃x n ψ, then a strategy function for player ∃ in the contest G(φ, A) is a map s from the set of all possible deals, to the set of elements of A. If a dealā is given, then player ∃ follows the strategy function s by making her first move s(ā). Similarly for other compound sentences φ. A strategy for a player in a contest G(φ, A) is a set σ of strategy functions, one for each quantifier etc. in φ which gives a choice to that player. In a play of a game G(φ, A,ā), we say that the player follows σ if he or she follows the appropriate strategy function from σ at each of his or her moves.
A strategy for a player P in a game G(φ, A,ā) is winning for P if P wins every play in which he or she follows σ. A dealā is winning for a player P in the contest G(φ, A) if P has a winning strategy for G(φ, A,ā).
We get a compositional semantics for first-order logic by assigning to each formula φ the following interpretation:
The interpretation φ A of φ in A is the set of all deals which are winning for player ∃ in the contest G(φ, A).
The usual inductive clauses apply, for example:
Tracing back through the definitions, it's not hard to show that this is exactly the Tarski semantics, translated into game language. We can drop the restriction on the position of ∼, at a small cost in complication. A strategy for the player ∃ in the game G(φ, A,ā) now consists of the strategy functions at those points within an even number of negation signs where ∃ makes a choice, together with the strategy functions at those points within an odd number of negation signs where ∀ makes a choice. Then we get
Again I leave the details to the reader. All of this is classical. Now we can move on to something new, the semantics under imperfect information.
Game semantics under imperfect information (ignoring negation)
Under imperfect information, the player P who first moves in a game G(φ, A,ā) may not know exactly which dealā is. We can represent this failure of information by an equivalence relation E(φ, A), or E for short, on the set of possible deals of G(φ, A). A strategy function s for P in G(φ, A) is said to be E-uniform if
for all possible dealsā,b. We say that an equivalence relation is trivial if two distinct objects are never equivalent. We want the formula φ to indicate where there is imperfect information. For this I introduce a sample of the devices allowed by Hintikka and Sandu [12] and Sandu and Väänänen [19] . Formulas will be linear, but each quantifier and each indexed conjunction or disjunction carries a slash to indicate which previous choices at quantifiers or indexed conjunctions or disjunctions are hidden. The ordinary quantifier ∃x is (∃x/) with nothing after the slash. (As above, I depart from Hintikka and Sandu by letting the slash operator indicate the hidden variable or index, but not whether it goes with ∃ or ∀, or with or .) If we leave aside the matter of negation and allow a very small amount of innocent paraphrasing, this covers all the sentences considered in [12] and [19] , together with those of Blass and Gurevich [4] .
In this reinforced language, each contest G(φ, A) has an equivalence relation E(φ, A) assigned to it in an obvious way. For example if φ(x 0 , . . . , x 6 ) is (∃x 7 /x 0 , x 2 )ψ(x 0 , . . . , x 7 ), then E(φ, A) is the relation E such that E((a 0 , . . . , a 6 ), (b 0 , . . . , b 6 )) ⇔ a i = b i whenever i = 0, 2.
The Hintikka-Sandu slash device always leads to equivalence relations of this kind, where we forget certain coordinates-equivalence relations formed in this way are called cylindrifications. (In fact the semantics described below would work for any equivalence relation on the set of deals.)
Again we assume until further notice that the symbol ∼ never occurs except immediately in front of atomic formulas.
We shall say that a strategy σ for a player P in a game G(φ, A,ā) is uniform if each of its strategy functions is E-uniform for the equivalence relation E assigned to the relevant contest. As before, a strategy for P in G(φ, A,ā) is winning if P wins every play of G(φ, A,ā) in which P follows σ.
The reader should check that if φ is a sentence, then the statement Player ∃ has a uniform winning strategy for the game G(φ, A).
says precisely that ∃ has a winning strategy in the game of imperfect information prescribed by the formula φ on A and . This is the game semantics which we want to put into compositional form. Consider a contest G(φ, A). We define a trump of G(φ, A) to be a nonempty set T of possible deals of G(φ, A) such that some uniform strategy σ for ∃ is winning for every G(φ, A,ā) withā ∈ T . We say then that σ is winning over T . (I use the word 'trump' to convey the idea of a set of deals which are all winning for ∃ for a uniform reason. Apparently the word is a corruption of 'triumph'.)
We define the interpretation φ A to be the set of trumps of G(φ, A).
Example 7.1
We note at once that every nonempty subset of a trump is a trump. The following construction shows that there are no other 'easy' closure conditions on sets φ A in general. Let Ω be any nonempty set, n a positive integer and F a family of nonempty sets of n-tuples from Ω which is closed under taking nonempty subsets. Suppose there is an (n + 1)-ary relation ρ on Ω such that for every nonempty set T of n-tuples from Ω, T ∈ F ⇔ there is b ∈ Ω such that ρ(āb) for allā ∈ T .
Let φ(x) be the formula (∃y/x)R(xy), and let A be the structure with domain Ω and the relation symbol R interpreted as ρ.
If φ is an ordinary first-order formula, then all the equivalence relations involved in G(φ, A) are trivial, so that every strategy is uniform. In that case a trump is just a nonempty set of winning positions for ∃, and so the new φ A carries the same information as our previous φ A . The map A → φ A gives a meaning to φ. We check that this notion of meaning meets the requirements.
Theorem 7.2
If φ(x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) is atomic then φ A is determined by the set ofā such that A |= φ(ā).
Proof. This is included in our remark above on ordinary first-order formulas. But in more detail: there is only the trivial strategy, which is trivially uniform. So a trump is just a nonempty set of tuplesā which satisfy φ in A. Note that by our assumptions on indexed conjunctions and disjunctions,ā might be for example (1, b) , satisfying the 'atomic formula' R i (x) by virtue of the fact that A |= R 1 (b).
Theorem 7.3
If φ is a sentence, then A |= φ if and only if φ A is not empty.
Proof. By definition, A |= φ if and only if player ∃ has a uniform winning strategy for G(φ, A). This in turn holds if and only if the singleton set { }, where is the empty deal, is a trump.
Lemma 7.4
Let θ(x, y) be the same formula as χ(x). Then for every nonempty set T of tuplesāb the following are equivalent:
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2. For every b, the set {ā :āb ∈ T } (write it T b ) is either empty or in χ A .
Proof. Suppose first that T satisfies (2) . Then for each nonempty T b there is a uniform strategy σ b for ∃ in the contest G(χ, A) which is winning over T b . Choosing one such σ b for each b (and here we use the axiom of choice), let τ be the strategy for ∃ in G(φ, A) which coincides with σ b on each game G(θ, A,āb), and has some arbitrary fixed value if T b is empty. We claim that τ is uniform. The reason is that y is not free in χ, and hence in particular it never appears unbound in a slash of χ. Thus deals with different values at y are never equivalent. This proves the claim.
Then (1) follows. The argument in the other direction is easier.
This allows us to define the meaning of φ(x) ∨ ψ(ȳ) in terms of the meanings of φ and χ. The first step is to replace φ and ψ by φ ′ (z) and ψ ′ (z) respectively, wherez lists without repetition all the variables inx orȳ. The lemma says that the meanings of φ and ψ determine those of φ ′ and ψ ′ . So without loss we can assume that φ and ψ have the same free variables.
Theorem 7.5 For every compound formula φ, φ
A is determined by ψ A for the immediate constituents ψ of A, together with the way in which φ is formed from these ψ.
Proof. We consider typical cases.
Suppose φ is (∃x n / . . .)ψ(x 0 , . . . , x n ), and the slashing on the quantifier determines the equivalence relation E = E(φ, A). (By the lemma there is no loss in assuming that x n is free in ψ.) Let T be a nonempty set of possible deals of G(φ, A). We claim that T is a trump of G(φ, A) if and only if there is a trump U of G(ψ, A) such that for every equivalence class X of E there is b for which the set {āb :ā ∈ X ∩ T } is a subset of U .
From left to right, if T is a trump then there is a uniform strategy σ for ∃ which is winning for every game G(φ, A,ā) withā ∈ T . The first strategy function s in σ, restricted to X ∩ T , has a constant value which we can take to be b (unless X ∩ T is empty). Then the set {āˆs(ā) :ā ∈ T } is a trump for G(ψ, A), which will serve as the trump U .
From right to left, suppose that a trump U for G(ψ, A) is given; then some uniform strategy τ is winning over U . For each equivalence class X of E with X ∩ T = ∅ there is an element b = b X as stated. (Here again we use the axiom of choice.) Extend the map X → b X in any way to an E-uniform strategy function s for G(φ, A). Then s together with τ is uniform and winning for ∃ in every game G(φ, A,ā). This proves the claim.
Suppose next that φ is (∀x n / . . .)ψ(x 0 , . . . , x n ). Then player ∃ has no strategy function for the opening quantifier ∀x n . Let T be a nonempty set of possible deals of G(φ, A). We claim that T is a trump for G(φ, A) if and only if the set {āb :ā ∈ T and b ∈ A} is a trump of G(ψ, A).
This is immediate.
Next suppose that φ is ψ 1 (∨/ . . .)ψ 2 . By the lemma and the remark after it, we can assume that ψ 1 and ψ 2 have the same free variables. Let E be the equivalence relation determined by the slash, and let T be a nonempty set of possible deals of G(φ, A). We claim that:
T is a trump if and only if T can be partitioned into two sets U 1 , U 2 such that 1. no tuple in U 1 is equivalent to any tuple in U 2 ; 2. for i = 1, 2 the set U i is empty or a trump of G(ψ i , A) .
The proof is as for existential quantifiers, with appropriate changes. Note that the trumps for the two contests G (ψ 1 , A) and G(ψ 2 , A) don't need to be connected in any way, because the strategy functions for ψ 1 are distinct from those for ψ 2 ; see example 5.1 above.
The other cases are similar.
Theorem 7.6 (Full abstraction) Let ψ(x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) and ψ ′ (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) be any two formulas with the same free variables (including those after slashes). Then the following are equivalent:
1. For any structure A whose signature contains those of ψ and ψ
2. For any sentence φ, if φ ′ comes from φ by replacing an occurrence of ψ as a constituent of φ by an occurrence of ψ ′ , then φ and φ ′ have the same truth value in all structures.
Proof. The implication (1) ⇒ (2) follows from the preceding theorems. We showed how φ A is a function of the interpretations ψ A of its constituents ψ, and so changing a constituent to one with the same interpretation can't alter φ A . We showed that φ A determines the truth value of φ in A. The other direction (2) ⇒ (1) is the one that rules out excess baggage. For notational convenience I assume that there are no indexed conjunctions or disjunctions. Suppose there is a structure A such that ψ A = (ψ ′ ) A . Then without loss of generality we can suppose that some set T of deals for G(ψ, A) is a trump for G(ψ, A) but not for G(ψ ′ , A). Form a new structure B by adding to A a new n-ary relation symbol R, interpreted so that R B = T . (Note that if ψ has slashes referring to indexed conjunctions or disjunctions, then R is more conventionally an indexed family of relation symbols.) Let φ be the sentence
where Q is a prefix of universal quantifiers and indexed conjunctions which binds all the free variables and indices in ψ. This sentence is true in B if and only if The set X of all possible deals for G(ψ, B) is a trump for the contest G ′ , namely
This condition holds. The initial choice point for player ∃ in G ′ has trivial equivalence relation, so any strategy function for her at this point is uniform. Let her use the strategy function s(ā) = 1 ifā / ∈ T 2 otherwise where 1, 2 point respectively to the first and second disjuncts. Combined with a uniform winning strategy over T in G(ψ, B), this gives a uniform winning strategy for player ∃ in G(ψ, B). Thus φ is true in B.
On the other hand X is not a trump for the contest
For suppose it were, with uniform winning strategy σ starting with strategy function s. Let τ be σ with s deleted, so that τ is a uniform strategy for ∃ in G(ψ ′ , B). By choice of T , τ is not winning over T , and so there are some dealā ∈ T for G(ψ ′ , B) and some play of G(ψ ′ , B,ā) in which ∃ follows τ but loses. Since σ was winning for ∃, we infer that s(ā) = 1; but in this case ∃ loses outright by the definition of R B . Hence the sentence
is false in B. But this sentence came from φ by replacing ψ by ψ ′ .
It would be pleasant if we could show that whenever ψ and ψ ′ are both of signature Σ, the structure A in the theorem can be chosen to have signature Σ too. I doubt that we can. which has indices as well as variables. One would like to be able to say that for each choice of values for the indices, the resulting atomic formula is a constituent. This is no problem for compositionality. As we saw, the set of trumps of the atomic formula above carries the same information as the set of tuples (a 0 , a 1 , . . . ; m, n, . . .) such that
We can give this set by giving, for each tuple (m, n, . . .), the set of tuples (a 0 , a 1 , . . .) such that A |= R mn... (a 0 , a 1 , . . .).
Adding negation
We can very easily allow game negation ∼ to occur in front of any formula. Its meaning is that the players swap roles, both for playing and for winning. So for example T will be a 'trump for player ∃' in G(∼ φ, A) if and only if it is a 'trump for player ∀' in G(φ, A). But what is a trump for player ∀? Before we answer that, note that the notion of a trump (for player ∃) already needs adjusting when ∼ is allowed to roam freely. A strategy for ∃ in φ consists of strategy functions which define her choices at her choice points. These are no longer the places where ∃ or occurs. Instead they are the places where ∃ or occurs inside an even number of occurrences of ∼, together with the places where ∀ or occurs inside an odd number of occurrences of ∼.
Now we define a cotrump to be a set of deals which satisfies exactly the same conditions as a trump, but with the players ∀ and ∃ transposed throughout. So the trumps for φ determine the cotrumps for ∼ φ, and vice versa. Classically no position can be winning for both ∀ and ∃; the corresponding fact here is that a trump and a cotrump of the same contest are always disjoint.
By arguments dual to those of the previous section, we know the cotrumps of G(φ, A) when we know the cotrumps of G(ψ, A) for the immediate constituents ψ of φ and the way these constituents are combined to form φ. So we can redefine the interpretation φ A to be an ordered pair consisting of the set of trumps for G(φ, A) and the set of cotrumps for G(φ, A).
The lemma and theorems of the previous section still hold when ∼ is allowed to stand in front of any formula.
Allowing classical negation to roam freely is a more perplexing matter. Let us say that a sentence φ is false in A if player ∀ has a winning strategy for the game G(φ, A). Then ∼ φ is true in A if and only if φ is false in A. We define ¬φ to be true in A if and only if φ is not true in A. Under imperfect information, being false is in general stronger than being not true.
I propose to deal with this by introducing a new operator ↓ (flattening) which restores two-valued logic on sentences. Thus ↓ φ will be true in A if A |= φ, and false in A otherwise. We can define classical negation ¬ by:
This reduces the problem to giving a semantics for ↓. Fortunately there is a natural candidate.
Let A be a structure and φ a formula. The operator ↓ binds no variables, so the possible deals for G(↓ φ, A) are the same as for G(φ, A). Suppose T is a nonempty set of possible deals for G(↓ φ, A). We say that T is a trump of G(↓ φ, A) if every deal in T lies in a trump of G(φ, A). We say that T is a cotrump of G(↓ φ, A) if no deal in T lies in a trump of G(φ, A).
Note that since a nonempty subset of a trump is again a trump, the condition 'deal a lies in a trump' is equivalent to '{ā} is a trump'.
This gives ¬ the right interpretation in front of a sentence and in front of a formula with no slashes. The theorem and lemmas of the previous section still hold, but at a price. In the presence of ↓ we can't define a game G(φ, A) for arbitrary A and φ. This means that the theorems have to be proved over again from scratch, using only the compositional semantics.
So the compositional semantics needs to be set out clause by clause, as in Part II below. When this is done, Theorems 7.2, 7.3 and 7.5 are immediate from the definitions. There is a small change in the proof of theorem 7.6 (Full abstraction). The lemma needs a proof by cases.
These technical points aside, our work is done. We have seen that the language proposed by Hintikka and Sandu does in fact have a compositional semantics along the same lines as Tarski's semantics for first-order languages, though inevitably more complicated.
PART II
This part will repeat the definition of the compositional semantics, more formally and without any reference to games.
The syntax
By a tuple we mean a finite sequence, possibly empty (i.e. of length 0).
A signature is an indexed set Σ of proposition, relation, function and constant symbols; each relation or function symbol has an assigned arity, which is a positive integer. We shall define a language L(Σ) for each signature Σ. We assume given an infinite stock of variables v, w, x, . . . , v 0 , v 1 , . . . where s is a finite string in which each item is either a natural number or an index. The atomic formulas include a symbol ⊥ not in Σ. Also for any two terms s, t there is an atomic formula s = t.
Compound formulas are built up inductively from atomic formulas as follows:
Unindexed conjunction and disjunction: If φ and ψ are formulas and W is a finite set of variables and indices, then
are formulas. When W is empty, we can abbreviate these formulas to
Indexed conjunction and disjunction: If φ is a formula, n is a positive integer, i is an index, and W is a finite set of variables and indices not including i, then We allow standard abbreviations, and also a new one:
¬φ is short for ∼↓ φ.
We call ¬ classical negation. We abbreviate (∀v/{i}) to (∀v/i), etc. The free variables of a formula are defined as usual, with quantifiers binding variables, except that each occurrence of a variable inside a set W in the context (. . . /W )φ counts as free.
Likewise an occurrence of an index as a subscript on a relation variable counts as free, and an occurrence of an index inside a set W in the context 
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A sentence is a formula which has no free variables and no free indices.
We write φ(v;ī) for a formula whose free variables are included in the tuplev of variables, and whose free indices are included in the tupleī of indices. We always assume thatv no variable occurs twice or more inv, and no index occurs twice or more inī.
It is not always convenient to keep variables separate from indices. So we also use the notation φ(ξ) whereξ is a tuple of variables and indices (again without repetitions) which includes all the free variables and free indices of φ.
Semantics
Suppose a structure A is given.
A deal for φ(v;ī) is a pair (ā;m) whereā is a tuple of elements of A, of the same length asv, andm is a tuple of natural numbers, of the same length asī. (There may be repetitions inā and inm.) We speak also of dealsᾱ for the formula φ(ξ)-the definition is clear.
Let φ(ξ) be a formula and W a subset of the set of variables and indices inξ. Then ≃ W is the following equivalence relation on the class of deals for φ: α ≃ Wβ if and only if:
for every k less than the length of α, if the k-th item inξ is not in W , then the k-th items in α and β are equal.
By a ≃ W -set we mean a nonempty set of pairwise ≃ W -equivalent tuples.
For each formula φ(ξ) we define the set of trumps in A and the set of cotrumps in A. One can read off most of the cases from the proof of theorem 7.5 above; but here they are in detail. By 'deal' we mean deal for φ. (Readers not familiar with mathematical definitions may find a remark helpful. To define a set S of nonempty sets of deals, it suffices to give, for each nonempty set X of deals, necessary and sufficient conditions for X to be in S.)
Atomic formulas: If φ(ξ) is atomic, then a trump of φ in A is a nonempty set X of dealsᾱ which satisfy φ in A. Likewise a cotrump of φ in A is a nonempty set Y of dealsᾱ which fail to satisfy φ in A. There are no trumps for ⊥, and every nonempty set of deals is a cotrump for ⊥. Unindexed conjunctions and disjunctions: Let φ be (ψ(∧/W )θ), where ψ, θ are ψ(ξ), θ(ξ) respectively. Then: 1. A set X of deals is a trump for φ in A if and only if it is a trump for ψ in A and a trump for θ in A. 2. A set Y of deals is a cotrump for φ in A if and only if it is not empty and there are U, V such that each nonempty ≃ W -set ⊆ Y lies in either U or V , U is a cotrump for ψ and V is a cotrump for θ. Dually, let φ be (ψ(∨/W )θ). Then: 1. A set X of deals is a trump for φ in A if and only if it is not empty and there are U, V such that each nonempty ≃ W -set ⊆ X lies in either U or V , U is a trump for ψ and V is a trump for θ.
2. A set Y of deals is a cotrump for φ in A if and only if it is a cotrump for ψ in A and a cotrump for θ in A. Indexed conjunctions and disjunctions: Let φ be i<n /W ψ, where i is a free index of ψ. Then: 1. A set X of deals is a trump for φ in A if and only if the set {ᾱp :ᾱ ∈ X, p < n} is a trump for ψ in A. 2. A set Y of deals is a cotrump for φ in A if and only if it is not empty and there is a cotrump U for ψ in A such that for each ≃ W -set Z ⊆ Y there is an index p < n for which {ᾱp :ᾱ ∈ Z} ⊆ U.
Dually, let φ be i<n /W ψ. Then: 1. A set X of deals is a trump for φ in A if and only if it is not empty and there is a trump U for ψ such that for each ≃ W -set Z ⊆ X there is an index p < n for which {ᾱp :ᾱ ∈ Z} ⊆ U.
2.
A set Y of deals is a cotrump for φ in A if and only if the set {ᾱp :ᾱ ∈ X, p < n} is a cotrump for ψ in A. Quantifiers: Let φ(ξ) be (∀y/W )ψ, where ψ is ψ(ξ, y). Then:
1. A set X of deals is a trump for φ in A if and only if the set {ᾱa :ᾱ ∈ X, a in A} is a trump for ψ in A. 2. A set Y of deals is a cotrump for φ in A if and only if it is not empty and there is a cotrump U for ψ in A such that for each ≃ W -set Z ⊆ Y there is an element b for which {ᾱb :ᾱ ∈ Z} ⊆ U.
Dually, let φ be (∃y/W )ψ. Then: 1. A set X of deals is a trump for φ in A if and only if it is not empty and there is a trump U for ψ in A such that for each ≃ W -set Z ⊆ X there is an element b for which {ᾱb :ᾱ ∈ Z} ⊆ U.
A set Y of deals is a cotrump for φ in A if and only if the set {ᾱa :ᾱ ∈ X, a in A} is a cotrump for ψ in A. Game negation: A trump for ∼ φ in A is a cotrump for φ in A. A cotrump for ∼ φ in A is a trump for φ in A. Flattening: A trump for ↓ φ in A is a nonempty set of tuples which are members of trumps for φ in A. A cotrump for ↓ φ in A is a nonempty set of tuples which are not members of any trumps for φ in A.
Proof. One proves the equivalence of (1) and (2) by induction on the complexity of φ. The same argument shows that a nonempty set U is a cotrump for φ in A if and only if U is a set of deals which don't satisfy φ in A. It follows at once that φ and ↓ φ have the same trumps, and that a nonempty set disjoint from all cotrumps for φ is a trump for φ. Finally we noted in the fact above that if T is a trump for φ then T is necessarily disjoint from every cotrump for φ, without any hypotheses on φ.
